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This study examines how widespread the similarities between U.S. and Japanese corpo-
rate governance practices have become. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many 
areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly 
from those in the United States – particularly in SEC-mandated reforms such as independent au-
dit and compensation committees. Our results suggest that corporate governance differences be-
tween Japanese and U.S. firms may be driven, in part, by differences in directors’ recognition of 
investors’ performance expectations. In particular, results indicate that the exit barriers related to 
employment influence decision-making for Japanese directors more strongly than they affect 
U.S. directors’ decisions.  Board independence – particularly with respect to audit and compen-
sation committee membership – reduces the height of perceived exit barriers. Results suggest 
that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and 
governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States although it does not con-
clude that the transition is necessarily desirable.  
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COMPARING EXIT DECISIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Waning investor confidence in the performance of Japanese corporations has motivated 
some Japanese firms to embrace corporate governance structures and practices that resemble 
U.S. board reforms. Western-style CEOs, like Howard Stringer at Sony or Carlos Ghosn at Nis-
san Motors, were recruited to restructure Japanese firms and introduce western governance prac-
tices to improve company performance. But how much progress has actually been made towards 
the convergence of corporate governance policies in Japan and the United States? Are disparities 
in Board structure reflected in their decisions to leave unprofitable lines of business? 
 
Ahmadjian & Robbins (2005) argue that the increasing pressure of Japanese shareholder 
capitalism has made some Japanese managers and corporate boards accept downsizing, divesti-
ture, and other corporate strategy practices that are more characteristic of western-style corporate 
governance.  Does this mean that Japanese board members use performance measures and deci-
sion criteria that are similar to U.S. board members, as well?  Milhaupt (2001) argues that Japa-
nese social norms opposing downsizing practices do not have a long history and that opposition 
to them is waning in light of the rise of shareholder-centered ideology in Japan.  Pease, et al 
(2006) suggest that greater turnover among Japanese shareholders may result in more corporate 
governance practices reflecting this change.  Since there are conflicting perceptions of how far 
corporate governance reform has progressed, this study examines how widespread the similari-
ties between U.S. and Japanese corporate governance practices have become – particularly with 
respect to downsizings and the treatment of distressed lines of business. 
 
Results suggest that in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese 
board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States 
where corporate boards have undergone substantial reforms to regain the confidence of Ameri-
can investors in a post-scandal era. Wu (2004) notes that public opinion has compelled the direc-
tors of U.S. firms to improve their corporate governance systems. Most notably, the financial re-
porting requirements of Sabanes-Oxley legislation and process of 404 internal controls certifica-
tion have strengthened corporate governance structures and practices in the United States -- mak-
ing independent audit committees stronger than they were in the era of Enron- and Tyco-related 
control scandals and making independent compensation committees more cautious about exces-
sive pay schemes in the U.S. In spite of Japanese investor concerns about similar Japanese ac-
counting scandals, our results indicate that reforms such as independent audit and compensation 
committees are not yet as widespread among Japanese boards as they are among U.S. boards.  
 
The rigorous corporate governance policies imposed in the United States by the oversight 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are a mixed blessing because – although 
shareholders can credibly rely on these reforms to expect that troubled businesses will be dealt 
with efficiently – the corporate managers who implement divestitures are heavily evaluated by 
expectations of shareholder value maximization in the United States. Their corporate boards are 
more willing to sell troubled U.S. businesses to owners that can obtain better performances from 
their assets. Managers typically expect their troubled lines of business to be divested to new 
owners (or liquidated) if their respective turnarounds are not achieved promptly.  
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Our results suggest that findings concerning corporate governance differences between 
Japanese and U.S. firms may be driven, in part, by differences in directors’ recognition of inves-
tors’ performance expectations (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Gugler et al, 2004). Against a back-
drop of strongly rising shareholder capitalism, financial considerations shape an increasing num-
ber of corporate directors’ perceptions concerning what constitutes attractive investment oppor-
tunities and which businesses to retain in the corporate family. Pressures to divest unprofitable 
lines of business now tend to overcome most barriers that could discourage exit decisions in the 
U.S. 
 
Earlier studies of divestiture found that timely disposals of assets were impeded where 
exit barriers were perceived to be high by corporate directors and managers (Harrigan, 1981; 
1982). Because exit barriers adversely shaped directors’ perceptions concerning the ease of di-
vesting underperforming assets (Porter, 1976), high exit barriers kept firms operating within 
troubled industries even where they earned subnormal returns on their investments. Our results 
indicate that such exit barriers have largely lost their power over U.S. managers and directors in 
many situations.  Results also suggest that exit barriers related to maintaining employment levels 
influence Japanese directors more strongly than they affect U.S. directors when contemplating 




 We created a 5-point Likert scale questionnaire in order to gather information about Jap-
anese and U.S. firms’ governance structures and perceptions of how to deal with their underper-
forming assets. The questionnaire was translated into Japanese by a native-born colleague. A pa-
rallel sample of publicly-traded firms in Japan and the United States was created to represent 
several industries from each nation’s economy. The Japanese questionnaire was mailed to the 
Presidents of 412 Japanese corporations with annual revenues in excess of ¥1 billion.  Many of 
the sample firms appear in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun.  Usable responses were received from 45 
Japanese firms representing 16 different industry classifications (an 11% response rate). The 
U.S. questionnaire was mailed to the Chief Executive Officers of 869 United States corporations 
with market capitalizations in excess of US$1 billion.  Usable responses were received from 72 




 We tested the effects of corporate governance traits (such as director and committee in-
dependence) on three forms of exit barrier using multivariate regressions. We report the specifi-
cations that yielded the highest corrected R2 values. As shown in Table 1, the coefficient of the 
dummy variable -- which indicated whether the respondent was Japanese – was always negative 
and statistically significant, which reduced the Likert scale’s average value by at least one in-
crement.  (In the questionnaire, “Strongly Agree” was coded as 5, while “Strongly Disagree” was 
coded as 1, and statistically-significant differences between the samples are reported herein.)  
-------- 





 Director independence is an area of great divergence between the samples -- perhaps be-
cause we used a stringent definition of it (that is consistent with the SEC’s definition of “inde-
pendence”). To be considered independent, directors are not (nor have they been) employees of 
the firm, represent neither supplier nor customer firms, and have no relatives holding key mana-
gerial positions within the firm nor other financial ties with it (other than shareholdings). Al-
though 90.3% of the respondents in the U.S. sample agreed that their directors (and the commit-
tees that they served on) were independent, none of the Japanese respondents agreed with this 
statement. This result may seem surprising because results from Kaplan & Minton (1994) sug-
gested that independent outsiders are being appointed with increasing frequency to Japanese 
boards to monitor firms’ performance. But outsider directors on many Japanese boards that are 
acting as representatives of the firm’s corporate and banking institutional investors are scarcely 
independent (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2005).  Moreover, responses from the Japanese sample reflect 
the reality that most Japanese directors have worked as employees for the same company that 
they oversee and have worked their way up their firm’s hierarchy before being appointed as di-
rectors (Cooke & Sawa, 1998). 
 
The Japanese responses to the question concerning the presence of retired corporate of-
ficers on company boards are consistent with Miwa & Ramseyer’s (2005) findings that indepen-
dent outside directors are most likely to serve on boards of Japanese firms in a very limited set of 
industries that may not be represented by this sample. Responses are not consistent with Peng’s 
(2004) observations about outsiders serving on corporate boards nor with Yafeh’s (2000) predic-
tions of convergence. Yoshikawa & Phan (2005) would assert that the executives and former 
employees of Japanese corporate boards do not consider themselves to be active monitors of top 
management. 
 
In Table 1 the coefficient of the CEO as only insider variable is positive but not statisti-
cally significant -- weakly suggesting that director independence does not reduce the impact of 
these exit barriers. The coefficient of the no retired officer as director variable is negative and 
statistically significant -- suggesting that if company officers remain on the board after retire-
ment, exit barriers arise for businesses with a large market share or for concerns about employees 
losing their jobs if the firm tries to exit from an unprofitable line of business. 
 
Director criticisms and shareholder primacy 
Valuing directors’ constructive criticism of managerial performance is an area of diver-
gence between our samples. In the statement linking director independence with the value of 
constructive criticism, 52.3% of the Japanese respondents strongly disagreed with the statement 
that director independence ensured that the company’s board of directors would be constructive-
ly critical of managerial performance, suggesting that director independence is not yet valued on 
Japanese boards. Since Klein (1998) found significant positive correlations between firm per-
formance and the number of corporate officers on finance and investment committees, we inter-
preted our result as suggesting that respondents in the Japanese sample believed that having in-
sider directors on their boards provides valuable information to other board members about their 
firm’s long-term investment decisions.  Moreover, as Yoshikawa & Phan (2005) point out, typi-
cal Japanese directors do not question executive management and do not delegate their mana-
gerial duties to corporate officers. In models testing firms’ exit barriers, the coefficient of the 
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constructive criticism variable is positive and statistically significant in the first specification (but 
loses its significance when the nationality variable enters the equation) -- weakly suggesting that 
having critical independent directors on a board does not ameliorate the impact of exit barriers 
due to sunk costs and having a large market share.  
 
Responses from the Japanese sample showed lower expectations that the board empha-
sized shareholder primacy in their decisions -- a contrast, perhaps, of the stakeholder- versus 
stockholder-oriented models (Abe & Shimizutani, 2007). Although 87.2% of the U.S. respon-
dents agreed with the statement that their firm’s board of directors primarily represents share-
holders’ interests and concerns by ensuring that the firm’s activities all create value, the domi-
nant answer in the Japanese sample was disagreement with that statement (51.2%), suggesting 
that Japanese investors tolerate more deviations in the returns realized from their firm’s invest-
ment activities. This finding is not surprising if Japanese corporate managers and directors are 
indeed the same individuals because the lines of control and intervention could easily become 
blurred -- particularly if no delegation of duties to executive officers occurs (Hirota & Kawamu-
ra, 2007).  
 
Independence of audit and compensation committees 
U.S. board committees generally follow the NACD’s Blue Ribbon Committee’ guidelines 
concerning board structures.  The boards in our sample differed in the independence of their 
committees. Where 90.3% of the U.S. sample strongly agreed with the statement that their firm’s 
audit committee was independent, all of the Japanese respondents disagreed with this statement. 
Audit committee independence is one of the non-negotiable board attributes mandated by SEC 
reforms and publicly-traded U.S. firms are castigated for failing to satisfy this structural re-
quirement (NACD, 2002). In Japan, it has been proposed that at least half of the audit committee 
members must be outside directors who cannot serve as executive officers of the company (Ta-
kehara & Nihei, 2005), but it is not known how many firms have embraced this recommendation 
for reform. 
 
Agrawal & Chadha (2005) found that independent directors with financial expertise are 
valuable in providing oversight of a firm’s accounting practices. In a question suggesting that all 
of the members of a firm’s audit committee were financially literate -- i.e., each member fulfilled 
the minimum regulatory requirements concerning the comprehension and use of financial state-
ments (Report of the NACD, 2004) -- 75% of the U.S. respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, but 86.4% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with this statement. Results suggest 
that in the selection of Japanese directors, financial literacy is valued less highly than in the case 
of U.S. boards. Indeed Cooke & Sawa (1998) report that some Japanese companies have corpo-
rate auditors – which are separate from accounting auditors – who are often appointed from the 
firm’s employee ranks with no particular financial qualifications.  
 
In the case of compensation committees, 97.2% of the U.S. respondents agreed that their 
board had an “independent” compensation committee as is required by the SEC (using the same 
stringent, SEC-inspired language as was used in the questions concerning the firm’s audit com-
mittee members), but 72.7% of the Japanese respondents disagreed with the statement that their 
board’s compensation committee was independent -- which is consistent with the Japanese prin-
ciple of internalism whereby companies are controlled by internally-appointed board members 
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(Buchanan, 2007). Internalism means that Japanese shareholders accept management’s recom-
mendations on most governance matters and proxy fights where shareholders reject managerial 
decisions are rare – even after the proposed takeover of Tokyo Kohtetsu was defeated in 2007 
(Morse & Moffett, 2007). 1 
 
In Table 1, the coefficient of the independent audit committee variable in is negative and 
statistically significant in the sunk cost specification (as it is also in the model testing the impact 
of employees losing their jobs as an exit barrier) -- suggesting that director independence within 
its audit committee reduces the firm’s exit barriers.  (The coefficient of the variable suggesting 
that an independent audit committee hires and fires the firm’s independent audit firm also is neg-
ative but not statistically significant in the exit barrier model specification where a distressed 
business unit has large market share.) The compensation committee determines CEO pay varia-
ble is negative but not statistically significant in the sunk cost exit barrier specification. 
 
Importance of preserving jobs 
In Japan frequent adjustment of employment levels during the negative phases of busi-
ness cycles has been regarded as an irresponsible transfer of business risks to employees (Suzuki, 
1999). Kang & Shivdasani (1997) reported that Japanese firms are less likely to downsize or 
terminate the employment of a large fraction of their workforce when they experience a decline 
in performance. 82.1% of the U.S. respondents disagreed with the statement suggesting that their 
firm would not get out of an unprofitable line of business if many employees would lose their 
jobs,. Although 37.1% of the Japanese responses also disagreed with the statement, the samples 
are statistically different regarding this deterrent. The reluctance of Japanese respondents to 
comment on this source of exit barriers may be indicative of the special role that lifetime em-
ployment policies play in Japanese society (Gilson & Roe, 1999), although Jacoby (2005) would 




In single-variable regression specifications, the coefficients were all negative and statisti-
cally significant (<.0001) for the independence of committee variables (e.g., for compensation 
and audit committees, respectively), their expertise (e.g., financial literacy of audit committee 
members) and for the tasks that they performed on behalf of the firm (e.g., hiring and firing audi-
tors, setting CEO compensation, and planning for executive succession). The nationality variable 
alone explained 35% of the variance in the sunk-cost model, 21% of the variance in the market-
share model, and 23% of the variance in the loss of employment model, respectively. 
                                                 
1 Takehara & Nihei (2005) define an outside director as a non-managing director who does not, and never did, man-
age the corporate affairs of the company or one of its subsidiaries as a director, executive officer, manager or other 
employee and who is not an employee of the company or one of its subsidiaries. The 2005 report of the Corporate 
Governance Forum of Japan recommends that at least half of the firm’s compensation committee must be outside 
directors – assuming that the Japanese firm has committees (instead of corporate auditors as overseers).  There are 
no restrictions about outside directors in Japan representing supplier or customer firms, having relatives holding key 
managerial positions within the firm, or having other financial ties with it (other than shareholdings) in these rec-
ommendations. 
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In corporate governance practices that maximize shareholder wealth, we expect U.S. di-
rectors to support divestiture when a firm’s restructuring efforts are not successful. Results sug-
gest that although downsizings in Japan have become more widespread, many Japanese firms are 
still resistant to them (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001). Indeed, Kang & Shivdasani (1997) report 
that when they experience a decline in performance, Japanese firms are less likely to downsize or 
terminate the employment of a large fraction of their workforce.  
 
Results suggest that a relationship exists between having independent outsiders on corpo-
rate boards and those boards’ willingness to divest underperforming assets. Results are consistent 
with the Perry & Shivdasani (2005) study of firms facing material declines in performance which 
noted that firms having a majority of outsiders on their boards were faster to initiate restructur-
ings leading to performance improvements. Results suggest that the absence of questioning out-
siders on Japanese boards increases perceived exit barrier heights in the minds of directors. It 
appears that although Japanese firms are slowly transitioning towards a greater emphasis on 
shareholder value creation (Whittaker & Hayakawa, 2007), convergence is occurring slowly for 
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“This firm will not get out of an unprofitable line of business … 
         
          …. until it has recovered      …. if it holds a large         …. if many employees 
                    its investment”           market share in it”    will lose their jobs” 
Intercept 3.7114 2.7700  4.2540 4.5161  3.1922 2.7857 
 (10.28) (15.32)  (8.39) (9.39)  (17.08) (21.02) 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
         
Nationality dummy,  -- -1.3006  -0.7832 --  -- -0.9648 
   where 1 = Japanese firm  (-7.34)  (-3.24)    (-5.71) 
  <.0001  0.0016    <.0001 
         
Director "independence" 0.1238 0.0947  0.0687 0.0722  -- -- 
   ensures directors are (2.13) (1.70)  (0.99) (1.03)    
   critical of management 0.0359 0.0928  0.3268 0.3054    
         
Only corporate officer who 0.0447 --  0.1211 0.1128  -- -- 
   serves on Board of (0.85)   (1.90) (1.78)    
   Directors is its CEO 0.3949   0.0600 0.0781    
         
No retired company officer -- --  -0.2502 -0.2403  -- -- 
   on Board after retirement    (-3.27) (-3.13)    
    0.0015 0.0023    
         
Audit Committee of  firm -0.3036 --  -- -0.2178  -0.2806 -- 
   is "independent" (-4.35)    (-3.23)  (5.94)  
 <.0001    0.0017  <.0001  
         
Audit Committee hires and -- --  -0.2315 -0.2303  -- -- 
   fires firm's auditors    (-1.95) (-1.94)    
    0.0541 0.0559    
         
Compensation Committee -0.2089 --  -- --  -- -- 
   determines pay of CEO (-1.98)        
   and ratifies other pay 0.0509        
         
         
Mean 2.2621 2.2882  2.5742 2.6239  2.1944 2.1927 
Corrected-N 102 108  100 96  106 107 
R-Square 0.4166 0.3567  0.3293 0.3588  0.2499 0.2334 
         
    Coefficient     
    (t-Value)     
    Pr > |t|     
 
